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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, : Case No. 910017 
v. : 
ROBERT P. HAGEN, : Category No. 14 
Defendant-Respondent. : 
REPLY BRIEF 
The following points are submitted in reply to the 
arguments presented in defendant's responsive brief. 
INTRODUCTION 
Although the State's opening brief first analyzes the 
reservation boundary question and then addresses the Indian 
status question, that order of argument should not be construed 
as defining the relative significance of the two issues in the 
context of this case. Because the court of appeals declined the 
State's invitation to wait for this Court's decision in State v. 
Perank, No. 860196, adopting the view that, "given the Supremacy 
Clause and the doctrine of collateral estoppel," this Court could 
not reach a decision on the boundary question in Perank contrary 
to Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 
1985) (en banc), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986),l the State 
was compelled to address in some detail the Perank issue. Br. of 
Pet. at 7-13. 
1
 State v. Haaen, 802 P.2d 745, 747 (Utah App. 1990), cert. 
granted, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). 
However, the boundary question will necessarily be 
decided initially in Perank, where a complete record on the issue 
exists, and the Perank decision will simply control the 
resolution of that issue here. Indeed, that is how the State 
presented the boundary issue to the court of appeals. Br. of 
Appellee, Case No. 900095-CA, at 5. In terms of the development 
of the law, the more significant issue presented by this case is 
whether the court of appeals correctly disposed of the Indian 
status question. Thus, the State's primary focus is on the issue 
of whether a remand for a determination of defendant's Indian 
status should have occurred. 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S POINT II 
IN ARGUING THAT PRINCIPLES OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
PRECLUDE A REMAND TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OF THE INDIAN STATUS 
QUESTION, DEFENDANT FAILS TO DRAW THE 
CRITICAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN INSUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE TO PROVE JURISDICTION AND 
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE GUILT. 
Defendant responds to the State's argument for a remand 
and reconsideration of the Indian status question by arguing 
explicitly what the court of appeals implicitly held: principles 
of double jeopardy prohibit a remand for reconsideration of that 
question. However, like the court of appeals, he fails to 
recognize the distinction in double jeopardy law between 
procedural error and a finding of insufficient evidence to prove 
the crime. See Burk v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978) (once a 
reviewing court has found the evidence insufficient to sustain a 
jury's verdict of guilty, the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a 
2 
second trial); State v. Lamorie, 610 P.2d 342, 347 (Utah 1980) 
("Reversal and remand for a new trial does not place the accused 
in double jeopardy where the error giving rise to the reversal is 
merely trial error, as distinguished from insufficiency of the 
evidence.M). 
As the court in State v. Hutcherson, 790 S.W.2d 532 
(Tenn. 1990), correctly noted, a failure to prove venue or 
jurisdiction, which are not elements of the crime charged, does 
not preclude retrial on double jeopardy grounds. Such a failure 
in proof amounts to an "error in the proceedings," and is not 
tantamount to a failure to prove the elements of the crime 
charged. 790 S.W.2d at 534-35. This reasoning is entirely 
consistent with the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-
501(3) (1990), which explicitly states that the existence of 
jurisdiction is not an element of the crime. Thus, the cases 
defendant cites which address double jeopardy in the context of 
insufficient evidence to prove the crime are inapposite. 
The only cases cited by defendant which address a 
defect in proof of jurisdiction are State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 
466 (Utah App. 1988), relied on by the court of appeals in 
deciding the instant case, see State v. Hacren, 802 P.2d 745, 748 
(Utah App. 1990), cert, granted, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991), and 
State v. Losolla. 84 N.M. 151, 500 P.2d 436 (1972), a case cited 
in Sorenson, 758 P.2d at 470 n.4. In Sorenson, the court 
reversed the defendant's conviction based on the state's failure 
to prove jurisdiction as required by section 76-1-501(3) and, 
3 
without analysis, ordered the defendant discharged. 758 P.2d at 
470. Citing Losolla, it concluded that "[t]his procedure [i.e., 
discharge] is appropriate where reversal is based on a failure of 
proof rather than an error in the trial proceedings." 758 P.2d 
at 470 n.4. The flaw in Sorenson's reliance on Losolla is that 
the the Losolla court considered jurisdiction to be one of the 
essential elements of the charged offense, 84 N.M. at 152, 500 
P.2d at 437, a view that is contrary to the plain language of 
section 76-1-501(3). Therefore, the discharge of the defendant 
in Sorenson due to the state's failure to prove jurisdiction was 
as erroneous as the discharge of defendant in the instant case. 
Implicit in defendant's argument is that this Court 
should consider unassailable the court of appeals' conclusion 
that, applying the applicable test2 to the evidence presented by 
2
 The court of appeals adopted the following test for 
determining Indian status and thus criminal jurisdiction: 
"Two elements must be satisfied before it can 
be found that [a defendant] is an Indian 
under federal law. Initially, it must appear 
that he has a significant percentage of 
Indian blood. Secondly, the [defendant] must 
be recognized as an Indian either by the 
federal government or by some tribe or 
society of Indians." 
Hagen, 802 P.2d at 747 n.2 (quoting Goforth v. State, 644 P.2d 
114, 116 (Okl. Crim. 1982)). This is essentially the test that 
was argued for by both parties below. Br. of Appellant, Case No. 
900095-CA, at 13; Br. of Appellee, Case No. 900095-CA, at 10. 
The parties and the court of appeals also agreed that enrollment 
in a federally recognized tribe, although a factor to be 
considered, is not required to establish Indian status. See 
Haaen, 802 P.2d at 747 n.2; Br. of Appellant at 13-14; Br. of 
Appellee at 11-12. 
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defendant, "there is simply no way this evidence could be 
'weighed' by the trial court to come to the conclusion that the 
state had met its burden of proving jurisdiction by proving that 
defendant is not an Indian." Haqen, 802 P.2d at 747. However, 
as noted in the State's opening brief, the question of Indian 
status for jurisdictional purposes is a question of fact most 
appropriately determined in the first instance by the trial 
court, which is in the best position to assess the credibility 
and weight of the evidence presented. See United State v. 
Torres, 733 F.2d 449, 457 (7th Cir.) (Indian status for 
jurisdiction is a question of fact on which the government 
carries the burden), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 864 (1984), State v. 
Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 & n.5 (Utah 1987) (trial court is in 
best position to assess credibility and weight of evidence). 
Here, in finding that defendant was not an Indian, the 
trial court relied most heavily on the fact that defendant was 
not a member of a federally recognized tribe (T. 25-26) (see Br. 
of Pet. at 5), and did not state which of the other evidence 
presented by defendant it found credible or what weight it 
attached to it (.id.). Had the trial court made specific findings 
of fact favorable to defendant concerning that other evidence 
(see Br. of Pet. at 3-4, for summary of evidence presented by 
defendant), perhaps the court of appeals could have reached the 
conclusion that it did, but those specific findings of fact were 
not made. Moreover, the trial court, as a part of the local 
community, is presumably more familiar with Indian affairs than 
5 
an appellate court which sits over a hundred miles away in a 
large city, and therefore is generally in a better position than 
the appellate court to resolve the factual question of whether 
the Indian community recognizes defendant as an Indian (community 
recognition being the second prong of the test for determining 
Indian status, see n.2, supra, and perhaps the determinative 
factor in this case).3 
Furthermore, although the court of appeals accepted the 
parties' position that the state carries the ultimate burden of 
proving jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence, Hagen, 
802 P.2d at 747, it did not make clear whether a defendant must 
present a prima facie case of Indian status before the burden 
shifts to the state to prove that the defendant is not an Indian. 
As noted in the State's opening brief, the State has argued in 
this case and in Perank that, to raise a jurisdictional question, 
3
 The State acknowledges that the prosecutor conceded a 
number of factual points below: (1) that defendant is a member 
of the Little Shell Band of the Chippewa Indians; (2) that 
defendant is a Pembina descendant; (3) that defendant resides in 
Myton, Utah, where he owns a home; and (4) that defendant 
receives some Indian medical benefits (T. 17-18). However, the 
prosecutor argued that defendant's 5/16ths Indian blood is "half 
as much as what it takes for local enrollment [in the Ute Tribe], 
"that defendant is not recognized as an Indian for purposes of 
Ute Tribal Court jurisdiction (attachment to Defendant's Exhibit 
6), that so many people in the area receive IHS medical benefits 
that "the chairman of the [Ute] Tribal Business Committee has 
complained and gone back to Washington [to complain]," and that 
defendant had not demonstrated any "real ties" to the Ute Tribe 
or Reservation beyond attendance at pow wows and tribal business 
meetings which, the prosecutor suggested, would not be uncommon 
for many persons in the area who are not Indian (T. 19-21). In 
short, the prosecutor argued that defendant was not recognized as 
an Indian by the Indian community — a factual question not 
explicitly resolved by the trial court. 
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a defendant carries the initial burden of producing prima facie 
evidence to establish Indian status — evidence that goes beyond 
mere suppositions or allegations. Br. of Pet. at 14. Assuming 
that this is the applicable standard4, the trial court should 
make the initial determination of whether this threshold burden 
has been met, not an appellate court. Again, the trial court is 
in the best position to assess the credibility of the evidence 
presented and to determine whether it goes beyond "mere 
suppositions or allegations." 
In short, the court of appeals impermissibly engaged in 
independent fact finding, based on an apparent misunderstanding 
of the law of double jeopardy and avoidance of established 
standards for resolving questions of fact. Defendant has neither 
justified, through legal analysis, the court of appeals' refusal 
to remand the case for reconsideration of the Indian status 
question under a correct allocation of the burden of proof and a 
proper standard of proof, nor demonstrated that the State's 
arguments for remand are not grounded in established law. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the court of appeals' 
A
 The Court should make explicit that this is the applicable 
standard. If it were not, and the defendant did not have this 
initial burden, the state would be placed in the difficult and 
unreasonable position of having to prove a negative — that the 
defendant is not an Indian — based solely on the defendant's 
unsupported assertion of Indian status. The court of appeals 
suggested approval of this latter standard when it observed that 
"even if the [trial] court chose to discredit defendant's 
testimony completely, the result would be that there is no 
evidence in the record at all concerning defendant's Indian or 
non-Indian statusf, and] [t]he state simply could not meet its 
burden in the absence of any evidence establishing jurisdiction." 
Hagen, 802 P.2d at 747-48. 
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holding that remand was prohibited and, if the resolution of the 
Perank issue so requires, order the necessary remand. 
REPLY TO POINT I 
THIS COURT IS ENTITLED TO DETERMINE STATE 
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION REGARDLESS OF ANY 
RULINGS OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS. 
Defendant claims that the State and the Utah courts are 
bound by the decision of the en banc panel of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Ute Indian Tribe v. 
State of Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert, 
denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986). That proposition is incorrect.5 
The issue is whether the courts of the State of Utah have 
criminal jurisdiction over this particular defendant. As the 
State argued in Perank, Utah's courts — not the the Tenth 
Circuit — should make that determination. 
The jurisdictional question hinges on whether the crime 
was committed by an Indian within the confines of an Indian 
reservation. As in Perank, the issue is whether the Uintah 
Valley Reservation was disestablished when it was opened by 
Congress in 1905 (see Perank, Br. of Resp. at 17-48). That 
determination is not a factual question, but requires 
interpretation of the specific congressional acts dealing with 
the opening of the Uintah Valley Reservation. The key is to 
5
 As discussed in the Introduction above, the central issue 
in this case is whether defendant is an Indian. If that is 
determined in the negative, whether the crime was or was not 
committed within an Indian reservation becomes irrelevant. See 
Br. of Pet. at 15-16 n.5. 
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determine congressional intent, since some surplus land acts 
diminished reservations and some did not. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 
U.S. 463, 468-70 (1984). This Court is entitled to its own views 
as to the effect and intent of the acts dealing with the Uintah 
Valley Reservation, since that question affects state court 
jurisdiction over virtually the whole Uintah Basin. Thousands of 
Utah's citizens — both Indian and non-Indian — are affected. 
If this Court wishes to let the federal courts 
determine state court jurisdiction, that is certainly its 
perogative. However, the issues in this case (and in Perank) go 
to the core of state court jurisdiction, and Utah's courts should 
be and are entitled to make that determination themselves. This 
is especially true when the Tenth Circuit's decision is erroneous 
and indeed has been questioned by the Tenth Circuit itself in the 
subsequent case of Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Company v. 
Yazzie, 909 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir.), cert, denied. 111 S. Ct. 581 
(1990) (see discussion in the State's opening brief, Br. of Pet. 
at 9-13). This basic jurisdictional determination should not be 
precluded by "collateral estoppel" or the like. In reality, 
defendant is not seeking to estop the State from arguing that the 
state court has jurisdiction; he is really arguing that this 
Court is barred from making its own determination on 
jurisdiction. 
As a matter of general law, state courts are not bound 
by decisions of federal circuit courts of appeals. In United 
States v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072 (7th Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 402 
9 
U.S. 983 (1971), the court held that while a decision of the 
United States Supreme Court on federal law has a binding effect 
on all courts (state or federal), the federal circuit courts of 
appeals exercise no supervisory jurisdiction over state 
tribunals, and their decisions are not binding on state courts — 
even as to matters of federal law. 432 F.2d at 1075-76. Accord 
People v. Luros, 4 Cal.3d 84, 92 Cal.Rptr. 833, 480 P.2d 633 
(1971), cert, denied, 404 U.S. 824 (1971); State v. Harmon, 107 
Idaho 73, 685 P.2d 814, 817 (1984); In re Sinclair, 197 Mont. 29, 
640 P.2d 918, 920 (1982); Bargas v. Warden, 87 Nev. 30, 482 P.2d 
317 (1971), cert, denied, 403 U.S. 935 (1971); First Wyoming Bank 
v. Trans-Mountain Sales & Leasing, Inc., 602 P.2d 1219, 1225 
(Wyo. 1979). The great weight of authority thus runs directly 
contrary to the holding of the Utah Court of Appeals below that 
the "Supremacy Clause" of the United States Constitution somehow 
makes the Ute Indian Tribe decision binding on Utah's state 
courts.6 
The South Dakota Supreme Court has not been reluctant 
to disagree with the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals on questions 
regarding disestablishment of Indian reservations. In both 
DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 430-31 (1975), 
6
 The court of appeals assertion in this context that it had 
"not been acquainted with the precise arguments advanced by the 
state in Perank," Hagen, 802 P.2d at 747, is curious, in that the 
parties' briefs in Perank had been filed in that court and the 
case had been set for oral argument before the court of appeals 
decided to certify the case to this Court (see Addendum). One 
would think that the court of appeals was fully aware of the 
State's and the defendant's arguments in Perank, and that is why 
the case was certified up for decision. 
10 
and Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 466 (1984), the United 
States Supreme Court granted certiorari specifically because of 
conflicting decisions by the Eighth Circuit and the South Dakota 
Supreme Court on whether or not a specific reservation had been 
disestablished. In the series of cases leading up to Solem, the 
Eighth Circuit first held that the Cheyenne River Reservation had 
not been disestablished. United States v. Erickson, 478 F.2d 684 
(8th Cir. 1973). That case was a habeas corpus proceeding in 
federal court against the State of South Dakota through the 
warden of the state penitentiary. In 1977, the South Dakota 
Supreme Court issued a decision in Stankev v. Waddel, 256 N.W.2d 
117 (S.D. 1977). That case was a suit by a member of the 
Cheyenne River Tribe challenging the taxation of her personal 
property by the local county. The South Dakota Court of Appeals 
ruled the tax invalid based on the Eighth Circuit's ruling in 
Erickson. The South Dakota Supreme Court reversed, disagreeing 
with the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of the acts which opened 
the Cheyenne River Reservation. 256 N.W.2d at 119. In 1979, the 
Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Duoris, 612 F.2d 319 (8th 
Cir. 1979), vacated, 446 U.S. 980 (1980), again ruled that the 
Cheyenne River Reservation had not been disestablished. In 1982, 
the South Dakota Supreme Court again disagreed in the case of 
State v. Janis, 317 N.W.2d 133 (S.D. 1982). That case was a 
criminal prosecution against a tribal member. In fairly strong 
language, the South Dakota Supreme Court disagreed with the 
Eighth Circuit's decisions, stating that the federal circuit 
11 
court had misinterpreted the acts opening the reservation. 317 
N.W.2d at 137. The United States Supreme Court finally settled 
the dispute in Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984). Nowhere 
in either Solem or DeCoteau did the United States Supreme Court 
even intimate that the South Dakota Supreme Court was bound or 
precluded by the contrary decisions of the Eighth Circuit. 
Significantly, the Ute Indian Tribe case is not the 
first time either the Utah Supreme Court or the Tenth Circuit has 
touched upon the status of the Uintah Valley Reservation. 
Shortly after Congress opened the reservation to settlement by 
non-Indians, the Utah Supreme Court, in Sowards v. Meagher, 37 
Utah 212, 108 P. 1112 (1910), and Whiterocks Irrigation Co. v. 
Mooseman, 45 Utah 79, 141 P. 459 (1914), recognized that the 
unallotted land within the original reservation boundaries had 
been "restored to the public domain." In 1946, the Tenth Circuit 
itself stated that the Act of 1.902 had restored the unallotted 
lands to the public domain. Hanson v. United States, 153 F.2d 
162 (10th Cir. 1946). 
In the 1970's, the question of the status of the Uintah 
Valley Reservation was specifically considered by this Court. 
The Court concluded that the original Uintah Valley Reservation 
had ceased to exist, but did so without detailed discussion. 
Brough v. Apparowa, 553 P.2d 934 (Utah 1976), vacated, 431 U.S. 
901 (1977). Pursuant to a petition for a writ of certiorari 
filed in Brough, the United States Supreme Court vacated the 
judgment and remanded for further consideration in light of 
12 
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977). However, when 
Brouah was remanded to the trial court by the Utah Supreme Court, 
it was then removed to the federal district court (U.S. District 
Judge Willis Ritter had previously restrained the State from 
proceeding in reliance on Brouah). The case was ultimately 
dismissed without any state court having reconsidered the 
reservation issue in light of Rosebud.7 
It is also important to note the different contexts in 
which the instant case and Ute Indian Tribe arose. Ute Indian 
Tribe was an action by the tribe for declaratory judgment as to 
the geographic area in which the Ute Law & Order Code is 
applicable. Ute Indian Tribe was to determine the boundaries for 
purposes of tribal jurisdiction over its own members.8 However, 
this case has nothing to do with tribal jurisdiction. It has 
only to do with whether federal jurisdiction preempts state 
criminal jurisdiction. The State did not "manufacture" either 
this case or Perank. It simply is attempting to preserve state 
court criminal jurisdiction in response to a direct challenge to 
that jurisdiction by defendant. Again, the jurisdiction of 
7
 Even the United States, as amicus curiae before the 
United States Supreme Court in opposing certiorari on Ute Indian 
Tribe, conceded that despite the decisions on the boundary 
question by the lower federal courts, the Utah courts might again 
be called upon to consider the boundary issue. (See Perank, Br. 
of Resp. at 6-7, for the exact quote from the Solicitor General's 
brief.) 
8
 The Ute Law & Order Code defines "Indian" as "any person 
of Indian descent who is a member of any recognized tribe under 
federal jurisdiction." Ute Law & Order Code, § 1-8-9(1) 
(emphasis added). Defendant is not a member of the Ute Tribe, or 
of a federally recognized tribe. 
13 
Utah's state courts should not be usurped solely by a 
questionable legal interpretation of the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments and those contained in 
the State's opening brief, this Court should reverse the court of 
appeals' holding that the case could not be remanded for 
reconsideration of defendant's Indian status and that this Court 
is bound by the Tenth Circuit's decision in Ute Indian Tribe. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this of December, 
1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON " 
Assistant Attorney General 
MICHAEL M. QUEALY 
Assistant Attorney General ~2>Bl— 
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to the Utah Supreme Court, pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(3) 
U.C.A. (1986 Suppl) and R. Utah Ct. App. 4B. 
It is hereby ordered that the above cases be certified to 
the Supreme Court for original appellate review and 
determination; all records on appeal, briefs, and all papers 
filed in this Court shall be immediately transferred to the 
Utah Supreme Court for further proceedings there. ^ ^ / 
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